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Context: How to Assess Success or Failure?
Social change does not just happen, it must be created, provoked, 
necessitated. Transforming systems that perpetrate injustice cannot 
depend upon determined forces, but rather requires the forces that we 
create. There is a long history of grassroots movements undertaking 
campaigns to challenge the political and corporate elite. Operating 
according to Utah Phillips’ dictum—“You’ve got to mess with people 
day and night”—diverse tactics have been employed against diverse 
opponents, with a wide range of successes and failures. 
Even when campaigns or movements are not explicitly organized 
under an anarchist banner, there are anarchistic influences wherever 
people collectively confront power in an effort to leverage control of 
their communities. Despite the well-known antagonism between 
anarchists and Marxist theory, ideology, and ideals, many anarchists 
nonetheless retain an adherence (often unintentional) to Marx’s politi-
cal economy. Yet much of what anarchists find objectionable in Marx-
ist theory—the determinism, the misinterpretation of state power, 
the vanguardism—was, for both the great thinker and his followers, a 
direct consequence of his economic theory. The labor theory of value 
is the vital component of Marx’s scientific socialism that foresees the 
necessary collapse of capitalism. Of course, Marx asserted that “men 
[sic] make their own history” but he followed that up with “they do 
not make it as they please.”1 He sought to discover the laws of histori-
cal motion, and no matter how he wished to empower individuals, he 
believed they remained ultimately constrained by the material realities 
of being. All of this, of course, is deeply contrary to anarchists who 
generally respond to existing conditions in an ad hoc and amalga-
mationist fashion rather than based on theoretical prescriptions. This 
means an antinomy exists between a general anarchistic adherence to 
Marxist political economy and their adoption of strategies and tactics 
on the fly. For anarchists, as long as there is oppression, the only neces-
sity is struggle. The forms of that struggle, the short-term aims and 
even the longer term goals, are not rigid or predetermined. Anarchists 
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have generally rejected the idea that there is or ought to be a pure or 
inherently revolutionary strategy or tactic. This is one of the reasons 
self-identified anarchists, or those who adhere to principles that would 
be considered anarchistic—autonomy, egalitarianism, solidarity, and so 
on—can be found in diverse social justice organizations and move-
ments. In this chapter we make use of a non-Marxist theory of value 
and capital in a way that informs and supports the ad hoc perspective 
on struggle and fighting to win. However, our primary purpose is to 
propose a method based on this theory as a means for social justice 
activists to assess their particular campaigns. Such assessment is, we 
believe, important if people in particular campaigns are to understand 
their own efficacy and if they are to be part of a larger movement in 
pursuit of a humane post-capitalist world. 
Further, we argue, such an analysis is a needed component of an 
anarchist economics. Although economics, as a science, is typically 
centered on production, distribution, and exchange, anarchists have 
long rejected the disciplinary reduction that tries to separate economics 
from politics. Production, culture, distribution, sexuality, communica-
tion, exchange, gender, and race—as just a few social institutions—are 
irreducibly intermixed. Our analysis attempts to deal with this real-
ity. In this way, we seek to theoretically catch up to practices on the 
ground, where anarchists are attempting to change our social worlds 
and take control of our lives through a praxis that does not isolate 
economics. Anarchists engage with production, distribution, and ex-
change as inalienable facets of life, and therefore subject to demands of 
equal access for all, with neither privilege nor exclusion.
Political-economic disruption campaigns (PEDCs) are among 
the most commonly adopted strategies that organizers within social 
justice movements use to confront dominant institutions, particularly 
corporations. These campaigns are incredibly diverse. Some have ex-
plicitly radical goals. Others have concrete and immediate aims. Some 
align themselves with broader justice movements, while others are 
narrowly focused on local issues. Some make use of old and familiar 
tactics. Others are tactically unpredictable and creative. Some espouse 
an absolute commitment to nonviolence. Others engage in property 
destruction, kidnapping, and assassination.
Whether employing boycotts or marches, coordinated public ac-
tions or autonomous clandestine disruptions, public outreach or direct 
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action, these struggles have shaped the politics, imagination, and par-
ticipants of the global justice movement. Whether these campaigns 
aim to reform or negotiate certain corporate activities, evict them from 
particular spaces, or aim to explicitly shut down their operations, they 
all target the political-economic body of corporate power: capital. 
However questions emerge: Have these campaigns had an impact? 
If so, what kind of impact? How can the success or failure of particular 
campaigns and tactics be assessed? Can these disparate campaigns be 
drawn together to inform and inspire anti-capitalist struggles?
A challenge posed to any movement that confronts dominant po-
litical economic entities is the difficulty of evaluating the actual effects 
of a campaign. We argue that organizers can rely upon a readily avail-
able tool for “empiricizing” political-economic disruption campaigns: 
the capitalists’ own quantitative references. Employing the concept of 
“differential accumulation” developed by political economists Jonathan 
Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, we examine the financial fortunes of 
corporations targeted by these diverse campaigns.2 As we detail later 
in this chapter, differential accumulation is a framework for evaluating 
the financial position of a corporation—or corporate coalition, against 
various benchmarks. Although there are many tools for evaluating fi-
nancial positions, we argue that this model is useful because it allows 
us to evaluate campaigns from the vantage point of capitalists. In this 
sense, it provides us with an idea of what these corporations feel and 
fear. To demonstrate this method, we will use differential accumula-
tion to “empiricize” three different campaigns: the anti-sweatshop 
movement, the Take Down SNC-Lavalin! campaign, and the Stop 
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC) campaign. We will consider the 
diverse organizing strategies employed by these groups/movements 
within the differential accumulatory contexts of their targets. We sug-
gest that among the advantages of this perspective for PEDCs are that 
it: a) provides a means of before-the-fact assessing actions and tactics 
employed by similar campaigns; b) allows for an after-the-fact assess-
ment of chosen actions and tactics; c) makes organizers cognizant of 
the actual processes underlying capitalist accumulation, improving 
their ability to disrupt “business as usual.”
These cases, like any other parts of the global justice movement, 
are complex and we are not interested in casting judgment on “success-
es” or “failures” in general. The model and opinions that we present are 
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not definitive and are, by design, offered to illustrate only the economic 
damages from the perspective of the targeted capitalists. We readily 
acknowledge that there are many perspectives from which to view vic-
tories or defeats. What our analysis offers is a preliminary quantitative 
perspective on diverse tactics of strategically organized campaigns as a 
means of judging their impact on the targets. This allows us to assess 
the contexts in which different strategies and actions have challenged 
the ability of corporations to accumulate. The campaigns discussed be-
low also display ways that organizers can create spaces and possibilities 
for themselves and broader global justice movements. 
“Differential Accumulation” as an Analytical Tool
The concept of differential accumulation has been developed by Jona-
than Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler over the last decade and was ap-
plied most fully in their book The Global Political Economy of Israel. In 
developing what they call the “power theory of capital,” Nitzan and 
Bichler argue that capital is a strategic power institution.3 Their theory 
stands in contrast with both the neoclassicist “utility theory of value” 
and Marxist “labor theory of value.” Profit and its transformation into 
capital cannot be understood on the basis of either neoclassical “factors 
of production” or Marxist accounts of surplus value. Both theories em-
ploy reductionism based on “impossible entities”—“utils” and socially 
necessary, simple, abstract labor, respectively. Contrary to the bottom-
up conceptions of capital and accumulation, Nitzan and Bichler hold 
that capital is “finance, and only finance.”4 Understood as an institution 
of power, capital represents the complex assemblages of assets under 
the control of particular capitalist entities, including the means of pro-
duction. Capitalists are able to manipulate these assemblages in order 
to increase, or—more importantly, as Nitzan and Bichler argue—to 
sabotage production in an effort to accumulate. This process includes 
much more than ongoing immiseration of the worker, or the develop-
ment of new, more efficient methods of production. Specific activities 
such as lobbying or marketing, but also broader social realities such as 
racism or nationalism, can become part of capital as they play a role in 
processes of accumulation. 
According to Nitzan and Bichler, “the accumulation of capital 
represents neither material wealth, nor a productive amalgamate of 
‘dead labor’, but rather the commodification of power.” In this sense, 
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“capitalised profit represents a claim not for a share of the output, but 
for a share of control over the social process.”5 Capital is the translation of 
control over the diverse social processes—including labor and produc-
tion—into a divisible, vendible quantitative representation while ac-
cumulation is the augmentation of that control. Given that power can 
only be understood as a relation between two entities, capitalists judge 
their accumulatory success in relative terms. In other words, they think 
differentially. The model of differential accumulation was developed to 
compare how capitalist actors fare in relation to each other. 
In contrast to absolute accumulation, which has no meaning once 
we reject the transcendent entities of neoclassical or Marxist value 
theory, the guiding logic of capital is to “beat the average [and] their 
(capitalists’) yardstick is the ‘normal rate of return’, their goal—to ex-
ceed it.”6 Differential accumulation can be calculated by the rate of 
growth of capitalization of one capitalist entity (or capitalist coalition) 
less the rate of growth of the average capitalization. In other words, it 
is a calculation of how corporations have compared against an average 
(whether it is their industry, or the particular market, or the market 
as a whole). For example, if a firm accumulates at a rate of 10 percent 
during a boom when their competition averaged 15 percent growth, 
that firm’s differential accumulation—despite its growth—has been 
negative. In other words, they have experienced relative deccumulation 
and their share of total social profits has decreased. On the other hand, 
if that same firm shrinks by 5 percent during a recession while their 
peers have lost 10 percent, the differential accumulation—despite an 
absolute loss—is positive. They have increased their share of capital-
ization and, despite the appearance of losses, have grown in relation 
to their peers-competitors. To increase your relative financial magni-
tudes is “to increase your relative power to shape the process of social 
change.”7 This means that both growth and loss can serve the interests 
of particular firms and moments of crisis or depression are not inher-
ently contrary to the interests of capital. Nitzan and Bichler stress that 
capital income does not depend on the growth of industry, but “on the 
strategic control of industry.”8 
The business press is suffused with language of “beating the av-
erage.” Beating the average means growing more powerful. It is to 
this end that capitalists function, undertaking exercises of massive 
social upheaval, in an effort to outperform their rivals. This means the 
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primary struggle of capitalism is the intra-capitalist struggle. As Nit-
zan and Bichler note, “The very essence of differential accumulation is 
an intra-capitalist struggle simultaneously to restructure the pattern 
of social reproduction as well as the grid of power.”9 Every other facet 
of society becomes collateral damage, rewarded or punished as part of 
diverse accumulatory endeavors.
As an example of how differential accumulation works as an ana-
lytical tool, we offer a demonstration concerning the pharmaceutical 
industry. Figure 1 displays two series, one absolute—the average capi-
talization of US pharmaceutical firms that are among the largest 500 
firms, the other differential—the ratio of pharma’s average capitaliza-
tion to that of the 500 largest firms.10 The chosen basis of comparison 
is based on another concept of Nitzan and Bichler’s—dominant capi-
tal. Their perspective means capital should not be treated as a singular 
entity with universally shared interests. Rather, each corporation or 
corporate coalition will have particular interests depending upon what 
sorts of assets they control and what means are available in their ef-
forts to augment their control. Within capital, they identify dominant 
capital as “the largest and most profitable corporate coalitions at the 
core of the social process.”11 Our aggregate of the 500 largest US firms, 
as measured by market capitalization, is a proxy for dominant capital.
Figure 1. Big Pharma Accumulation: Differential or Absolute?
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The absolute series, measured in millions of dollars, on the right 
hand axis, shows incredible growth from 1952 until 1999. From 1999 
on, it appears to stagnate at its high level of capitalization. The differ-
ential series gives a different picture of what happened to Big Pharma 
after 1998. Instead of simply stagnating, we can see that pharma lost 
ground to other dominant firms in the accumulatory struggle. In 1952, 
the average member of Big Pharma was smaller than the average 
member of dominant capital (the ratio is less than one), while by 1998, 
the average pharma firm is three times larger. Their rate of differential 
accumulation was 2.5 percent per year, a stunning performance against 
the largest, most powerful firms. By 2007, however, they had fallen 
to less than twice as large, differentially deccumulating 5 percent per 
year. The differential perspective motivates different questions than 
the absolute. In fact, once we dismiss as ridiculous and/or unworkable 
the transcendent entities of absolute accumulation, the absolute can 
provoke no questions. In order to answer the questions that emerge 
from the differential picture, we need to look at the entire field of so-
cial processes that bear on accumulation, and not solely to labor and 
production. The pharmaceutical industry is heavily dependent upon 
intellectual property rights and marketing. It works to forge personal 
relationships with physicians. Much of the research that goes into its 
most profitable drugs emerges from government or university labs. A 
lot of money is spent developing “copycat drugs.” All of this and much 
more needs to be considered in trying to explain how Big Pharma 
grew, and why it has fallen. For those involved in PEDCs, this depen-
dence of capital upon complex social processes means disruption of 
production is not strictly necessary to disrupt accumulation. Rather, 
targeting any of the processes upon which the firm depends may have 
an impact. This confirms the street-level adoption of strategies and 
tactics that have always been anarchists’ modus operandi, over the at-
tempt by Marxists to adhere to strategies informed by their pet theory.
Given the importance of capital accumulation for the capitalists’ 
understanding of their own success, it provides us with a means of 
judging the success of PEDCs that target individual corporations. 
Although the differential perspective is not the only means to judge 
success, it does allow an assessment from the capitalists’ own perspec-
tive: did the PEDC hurt its targets? If a campaign’s actions are as-
sociated with particular moments of differential deccumulation, or, 
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more importantly, an entire campaign is associated with a trend of 
differential decumulation, then it seems, all else equal, fair to judge 
the campaign a success, even if specific goals and outcomes have not 
been achieved. Of course, caution is always required when trying to tie 
accumulatory movements to a specific cause, given the complex multi-
tude of forces acting upon and being enacted by any given corporation. 
Nonetheless, if due caution is taken, campaigns should not hesitate 
to declare victory when such decumulatory trends are associated with 
the campaign. In the context of the global justice movement, where 
confrontational action is a permanent practice of addressing diverse 
injustices, we can use this model as a method to evaluate campaigns 
that challenge capitalists, large and small. 
Using case studies of three disparate campaigns, all of which in-
cluded participants who expressly identified as anarchists, we hope 
to draw some examples and lessons about what actions have worked 
against what sorts of corporations. Specifically, we will first consider 
the anti- sweatshop movement’s targeting of Nike. A widespread cam-
paign that included a range of political perspectives, from liberal to 
anti-capitalist, the campaign was one of the precursors to the North-
ern anti- globalization movement. Secondly, we will examine the ‘Take 
Down SNC-Lavalin!’ campaign. Undoubtedly unfamiliar to most, it was 
a small, short-lived campaign that took place in eastern Canada and 
Quebec. Despite its local character, it nonetheless managed to exact a 
toll on its target, a leading global engineering corporation. Finally, we 
will analyze the SHAC campaign that has recently been the subject of 
an intense governmental crackdown on so-called “eco-terrorism,” pre-
cisely because of the huge impact it was having on its target. The conclu-
sions we draw are tentative but we hope they encourage discussion about 
possibilities and strategies/tactics for fighting (and beating) capitalists. 
We especially hope to show that if campaigns are knowledgeable about 
their targets and willing to be flexible in terms of tactics, they can exact 
a sizable toll on the financial fortunes of targeted corporations. This is 
true both for well-organized, broad-scale campaigns as well as those that 
consist of just small groups of disciplined and dedicated organizers. 
Case Study 1: Anti-Sweatshop Targeting of Nike
In the mid-1990s, Nike became the paragon of corporate exploi-
tation. The sweatshop emerged as the symbol of global corporations’ 
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valuation of profits over workers, the environment, and human dignity. 
Although, the charge had been leveled against the company since the 
late 1980s, it was only in 1996 that it began to stick. The close associa-
tion between the shoe designer-marketer—it can hardly be called a 
shoemaker—and sweatshops emerged from a more general campaign 
against the use of child labor by American corporations that began 
to build momentum during the early 1990s. In 1996, the Apparel 
Industry Partnership, a presidential taskforce with both industry and 
non-industry participants, convened to draft an agreement on job con-
ditions. In April 1997, the group reached an agreement that, among 
other things, set minimum age and maximum hour requirements. 
However, it was too late for Nike, as the “swoosh” emerged from tight 
competition with Kathy Lee Gifford as the face of sweatshops.
Nike had been a corporate wonderkind. Just one of many shoe com-
panies of the 1980s, its innovative branding allowed it to rise above the 
pack. It hitched its wagon to Michael Jordan, whom it then marketed as 
no other athlete had ever been before. Air Jordans became a must-have 
item, particularly for inner-city youth. In the process, following the logic 
of accumulation, it sought to boost earnings by pushing down costs. To 
this end, it began to ship jobs to low-wage zones in Asia. It was hardly 
unique in this. However, its own success would bring blowback as its 
high profile led anti-sweatshop activists to focus their attention on the 
sportswear company that claimed to be about more than shoes.
The campaign against Nike was almost entirely focused on public 
education, although participants also sought to shame both CEO Phil 
Knight and Jordan personally. Actions were usually little more than 
public spectacles, picketing and flyering. At the time of publishing No 
Logo, Naomi Klein could find only one incidence of vandalism against 
a Nike Town outlet.12 Yet, as can be seen in Figure 2, between 1996 
and 1997 the actions taken against Nike had a huge impact on its 
accumulation. The company differentially accumulated 13.5 percent 
per year from 1981 to 1996, then from 1996 to 1999 it differentially 
deccumulated at a stunning 28 percent per year. Similar to the graph 
for Big Pharma, this graph charts Nike against dominant capital. In 
1986, Nike was barely 10 percent the size of an average member of 
this group. By 1996, it was 21 percent larger than the average member. 
Then, in 1999, it’s just half the size. Since 1999, despite the continued 
pressure on the company, accumulation has resumed. Nike may have, 
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paradoxically, benefited from the growth of the “anti-globalization” 
movement as it moved from a criticism of specific companies to cor-
porations and capitalism more generally. Nike became just another 
corporate miscreant among many.
Nike was susceptible to the tactics adopted by the anti-sweatshop 
movement because of its dependence on public image. It was a pio-
neer of advertising that did not directly pitch its product. Instead, 
it touted a “lifestyle” and then associated itself with that lifestyle. It 
championed women’s right to participate equally in sports. It had ads 
with Tiger Woods observing that there are still some courses from 
which he is banned because of the color of his skin. Its philanthropic 
endeavors provided sports equipment to impoverished children. This 
carefully constructed image was so thoroughly at odds with the reali-
ties of sweatshops that simply exposing their involvement tarnished it. 
As one of the world’s best-known brands, they were also susceptible 
to “culture jamming”: defacing billboards, using corporate logos and 
slogans in sarcastic and subversive counterattacks. Once Nike’s use of 
overseas sweatshops became general knowledge, any defaced billboard 
or advertisement served as an instant reminder. Although Nike had 
positioned itself head and shoulders above its competition in terms of 
the social appeal of its shoes, it nonetheless faced intense competition. 
Figure 2. Anti-sweatshop Campaign: Taking a Toll on Nike
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It was not difficult for consumers to switch to another brand. Culture 
jamming has been rightly criticized as a limited and non-revolutionary 
tactic. However, as we noted above, there is no pure or revolutionary 
tactic. Although tactics must accord with the principles of the organiz-
ers, their only other criterion is effectiveness and for this campaign, it 
appears to have been effective. Of course culture jamming will not, in 
and of itself, foment revolution, but neither will any other tactic. The 
effectiveness of culture jamming is limited to corporations dependent 
upon their image. The campaign against Nike was so effective that it 
even warranted a mention in its annual report to investors. Forced to 
explain Nike’s poor performance in 1997, Knight cited “labor prac-
tices” and the “alarmed” consumer. Although Knight promised that 
both media and consumers were being “informed,” we can see that the 
message took a few years to get through. In fact, although Nike began 
to recover in 1999, it wasn’t until 2001—the year resistant movements 
refocused on antiwar efforts and away from corporate misdeeds—that 
it resumed its early growth levels.
Although Nike managed to escape the accumulatory purgatory 
into which it was relegated, the anti-sweatshop campaign managed to 
inflict significant damage. Klein demonstrates how common the dif-
ferential perspective is, although lacking any theoretical component, 
when she compares Nike’s performance to that of Adidas.13 During 
the campaign against Nike, Adidas managed to overtake them and 
has remained larger, if only just, ever since. This highlights one of the 
consequences of PEDCs: they may benefit others. Adidas is just as 
implicated in the use of sweatshop labor as Nike, yet it avoided the 
same sort of scrutiny and has been the differential benefactor of Nike’s 
decline. However, as long as capitalism remains, there will necessarily 
be those who benefit from one corporation’s differential decline. As 
with the particular tactics of political economic disruption, PEDCs 
themselves are not inherently anti-capitalist. Rather, their purpose is 
to insert us into the accumulatory process, to become risk factors that 
must be accounted for. 
Case Study 2: Take Down SNC-Lavalin!
Organized under the explicitly anti-capitalist hallmarks of the 
People’s Global Action, the Take Down SNC-Lavalin! campaign was 
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a collaboration between Ottawa’s Catapult! Collective, June 30th in 
Toronto, and Block the Empire in Montreal. The target, SNC-Lavalin, 
was a provider—through subsidiary SNC TEC—of ammunition to 
the US occupation in Iraq. The campaign featured various tactics, in-
cluding public education, confrontational marches, covert information 
gathering from SNC workers, public spectacles and symbolic actions, 
and calls for autonomous direct actions. 
In Ottawa, several marches targeted the SNC office building as 
part of a campaign that highlighted war profiteering in general. The 
high-profile “snake marches” took place in the downtown core, and 
disrupted traffic and business around the buildings housing US de-
fense corporations, including Raytheon and General Dynamics. On 
the international day of solidarity with Iraq in 2005, Catapult! mem-
bers scaled the façade of SNC’s Ottawa office building to call atten-
tion to all manner of exploitive practices, including the production of 
munitions, the degradation of the environment, and their destructive 
mining and biotech projects around the world. In Montreal, members 
of Block the Empire tried to install a photo exhibit featuring images 
of occupied Iraq entitled “Your Bullets, Iraqi Lives,” in the lobby of 
SNC’s corporate headquarters, a building that the company shares 
Figure 3. Take Down SNC-Lavalin!: Relative to the S&P 500
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with the US consulate. In Toronto, organizers crashed a banquet 
hosted by SNC-Lavalin. A diverse collection of activist organizations 
participated in a protest outside SNC’s 2005 Annual General Meet-
ing, which drew national media attention. As news stories noted, the 
protest overshadowed the company’s otherwise “promising outlook.”
We have charted the differential status of SNC relative to the S&P 
50014—as a proxy for dominant capital—from 2002 until 2006. The 
campaign lasted from early 2005 until early 2006. Our data indicates 
that SNC experienced a significant change in its accumulatory trend 
over this period. As can be seen in Figure 3, SNC enjoyed significant 
accumulation in the period before the campaign began. In the year 
prior to the first week of April 2005, SNC gained 53.5 percent relative 
to the S&P 500. Over the course of the campaign their accumulation 
stagnated. Eventually the campaign lost its momentum and stopped 
mobilizing when it realized one of its goals: SNC’s divestment from its 
arms-producing entity SNC TEC. At that point SNC resumed its up-
ward accumulatory trend. As noted above, there is no absolute “average” 
against which capitalists judge their success, this too is contingent. As 
such, we also charted SNC’s performance against an index composed 
of two of its sectoral competitors—fellow Canadian engineering firm 
Aecon and a US firm of roughly the same size, Jacobs Engineering. 
Figure 4. Take Down SNC-Lavaline!: Relative to Competitors
Accumulation_INT.indd   107 12/7/11   6:30 PM
108. The.Accumulation.of.Freedom
This shows even more clearly SNC’s differential fate over the du-
ration of the campaign. From its apex, the week of April 25, 2005, to 
its nadir, the week of January 23, 2006, SNC-Lavalin differentially de-
cumulated 34 percent. In the context of SNC’s global reach, its engage-
ment in several sectors, and its political connections, this frozen (or de-
clining) period is of significant interest. Why did SNC-Lavalin’s trend 
of accumulation stall? Were investors frightened by public associations 
with war profiteering? Did they prefer the relative anonymity of other 
potential investment opportunities? Did they fear the confrontational 
style of the Take Down SNC organizers? Did they worry that more 
disruptive direct actions were to come? These are all possibilities that 
require further consideration.
Both graphs demonstrate that accumulation continued beyond 
the start of the campaign, and resumed before what we’ve identified 
as the end—the aforementioned sale of SNC TEC. The continuation 
of accumulation beyond the start of the campaign is not surprising. A 
single march criticizing SNC-Lavalin was unlikely to be considered a 
threat to accumulation. However, the beginning of the campaign was 
particularly intense. With actions in the three aforementioned cities 
the campaign appeared to be widespread. Activists in Halifax and Van-
couver also incorporated criticism of SNC into their antiwar efforts. 
The resumption of accumulation before what we’ve identified as the 
end of the campaign is also unsurprising. For various reasons, the cam-
paign lost steam and began to peter out. The resumption of accumula-
tion shows that market participants felt the PEDC against SNC was 
no longer a threat. Perhaps this occurred because a forthcoming sale 
of SNC TEC was suspected which would defuse criticism of SNC-
Lavalin as a “war profiteer.” The market let the campaign know it was 
over. Nonetheless, we conclude that the campaign had an impact and 
managed to hit SNC-Lavalin where it hurt and should be considered a 
factor in the company’s decision to sell its munitions production.
Two features of SNC-Lavalin allowed the chosen tactics of the 
Take Down campaign to be successful. First, SNC TEC was a relatively 
minor production segment as a percentage of SNC’s earnings. SNC’s 
primary business is engineering-related. Although its engineering and 
other activities also provide grounds for criticism, they are not directly 
implicated in war. Second, although SNC-Lavalin is one of Canada’s 
largest corporations, with operations and political connections all over 
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the world, the corporation is little known. This made them susceptible 
to a public education campaign that brought both the public and me-
dia spotlight to bear upon them, particularly when it focused on the 
company as a “war profiteer.” The relative unimportance of SNC TEC 
for earnings made it more likely SNC-Lavalin would judge the gains 
of diverting the public glare to outweigh any decline due to the loss of 
SNC TEC’s profits. 
SNC TEC was sold to General Dynamics, whose business is 
almost entirely military-related. Notably, we do not believe a similar 
naming and shaming campaign aimed at them is likely to succeed in the 
same way. While SNC-Lavalin and its investors were not prepared to 
be decried as “war profiteers,” General Dynamics undoubtedly is. Any 
investors with moral or practical objections to “war profiteering” have 
already placed their capital elsewhere. This does not mean a campaign 
against General Dynamics is impossible, just that it could not rely on 
the same tactics. The fact that SNC TEC was sold to General Dynam-
ics and continues to produce bullets sold to the US military means that 
the success of the Take Down! PEDC was certainly limited. Nonethe-
less, it is significant that a short campaign organized by a couple dozen 
people spread throughout three cities managed to have this impact on a 
multi-billion-dollar corporation. Take Down SNC-Lavalin! succeeded 
in injecting itself into the accumulatory efforts of SNC-Lavalin and its 
success required their capitulation, however limited.
Case Study 3: Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC)
The SHAC campaign officially began in 1999 and has developed into 
an international campaign, comprised of several dozen active groups. 
Although many organizers are associated with other elements of the 
animal rights and animal liberation movements, the SHAC cam-
paign is organized with the exclusive objective of shutting down the 
 vivisection firm Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS). 
Since the beginnings of the SHAC campaign, organizers have 
scored numerous victories against HLS. Through their relentless an-
tagonism they provoked several banks and financiers to pull loans and 
scared hundreds of business partners into terminating contracts and 
severing business relations. In the words of HLS Chairman Andrew 
Baker they engendered a widespread view of HLS as “a pariah” of 
the business world. Strategically, SHAC has identified secondary and 
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tertiary targets and taken direct action against them as well. Secondary 
targets include the banks that have given financial support to HLS, 
while tertiary targets include the customers of secondary targets. The 
intention has been to provoke a decumulatory fear in the financiers so 
they would sever ties with HLS, rather than risk losing other custom-
ers. SHAC stresses that their efforts focus on publishing material about 
animal abuse and issuing action alerts through their websites and mail 
lists. Their websites and publications publicize this material and partici-
pating groups, to varying degrees, encourage individuals to undertake 
a broad array of tactics to confront these targets. These have included 
business disruptions, encouragement of autonomous actions, large 
and small rally demonstrations, property destruction, letter-writing 
 campaigns, ethical investment strategies, boycott organizing, and so on. 
Figure 5 SHAC Crackdown: ‘Eco-terrorism’ and Accumulation
The most well-known tactic associated with SHAC is the “home 
demonstration.” These involve activists confronting vivisectors, finan-
ciers, and corporate executives at their residences. These non-violent 
but highly confrontational tactics are meant to bring attention and 
shame upon their targets (and their families) in an attempt to undo 
the privacy and secrecy that are important components of the political 
economy of the vivisection industry. The wide range of direct action 
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targets was a central motive underlying the corporate-state suppres-
sion campaign against SHAC. In fact, our research indicates that it 
was precisely the success of their tactic that provoked the government’s 
heavy-handed suppression. 
The public visibility of organizers involved in SHAC made them 
a scapegoat upon which the government could hang every direct ac-
tion committed by environmental and animal liberation groups and 
autonomous cells. Politicians, media, and prosecutors in the United 
States and United Kingdom have frequently made the association 
between groups affiliated under SHAC and actions undertaken (and 
claimed) by autonomous individuals and groups, such as the Animal 
Liberation Front (ALF). The government has claimed that because 
SHAC affiliated groups provide information about animal abusers, 
they are facilitating or even interchangeable with the ALF. 
Citing “eco-terrorism,” the corporate-state suppression campaign 
against SHAC developed over several years. Our graph depicting the 
differential accumulation of HLS has marked four notable moments 
in the state-corporate suppression campaign targeting SHAC. These 
dates are: “A”—the indictment of the US SHAC 7; “B”—the convic-
tion of the US SHAC 7; “C”—the signing of the enhanced US Animal 
Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA), an amplified version of the Animal 
Enterprise Protection Act under which the SHAC 7 were charged; 
and “D”—Operation Achilles that targeted organizers of SHAC and 
the general animal liberation movement in the United Kingdom and 
other Western European countries. 
Our graph begins in 2002 after HLS moved their headquarters to 
the United States under the shell company Life Science Research. After 
SHAC UK successfully prevented HLS from accessing capital markets 
in the United Kingdom, by targeting both the banks that provided loans 
and the “market makers” needed to participate in equity markets, the 
corporation moved to the United States in an attempt to access new 
pools of investors and capital. HLS also hoped to benefit from stron-
ger privacy protections accorded to US investors compared to their UK 
counterparts to prevent SHAC from targeting their capital sources. 
As seen in Figure 5, from 2002 to 2003, HLS accumulation 
was stagnant. This suggests that following the HLS move to the 
United States, the SHAC campaign was successful in halting the 
corporation’s differential growth. However, in late 2003, coincident 
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with the US government’s increasing criminalization of the activi-
ties of SHAC USA organizers, HLS began to accumulate. With 
the indictment of the SHAC 7, HLS experienced a sharp rise in 
differential accumulation. This accumulatory trend became more tur-
bulent in early 2005, perhaps over uncertainty concerning the verdict 
in the SHAC 7 trial, although SHAC UK was also still active. A 
renewal of accumulatory growth was associated with the SHAC 7’s 
conviction. After the conviction, HLS’s accumulation was upward, 
but still turbulent. Undoubtedly this was because SHAC’s interna-
tional presence meant the US government’s legal maneuvers had not 
completely neutralized SHAC. The passage of the AETA marks an 
intensification of the upward trend, indicating an expectation that 
this was another nail in the coffin of SHAC. With the initiation 
of Operation Achilles, the United Kingdom aligned its criminaliza-
tion of environmental and animal liberation with the United States. 
This released HLS from most of the perceived risk of SHAC’s direct 
 action and the corporation’s differential accumulation skyrocketed.
Aside from the debate about whether or not these criminal proceed-
ings had a neutralizing effect on the campaign, our data suggests that 
the corporate-state campaign against SHAC and the imprisonment 
of activists was perceived as a victory for HLS by market participants. 
The accumulatory trend illustrates the logic behind the corporate-state 
counter-campaign targeting SHAC. In contrast to the early period of 
the graph—where SHAC was inflicting significant disruption against 
HLS and its allies, preventing any differential accumulation—the final 
portion of the graph indicates that the surge in capital accumulation 
coincided with the corporate-state suppression campaign of so-called 
“eco-terrorists.” Freed from the threat of disruption, HLS achieved 
significant differential success following the state’s efforts to neutral-
ize and demobilize the SHAC campaign. This evidences the earlier 
success of the SHAC campaign to seriously impact the accumulatory 
efforts of its target. Further, it indicates how far capital can and will go 
to remove a threat that is truly hitting it where it hurts.
The success of SHAC’s PEDC seriously threatened the future of 
HLS. The UK government had to intervene with loans and special dis-
pensations when banks and other business service firms refused to do 
business with the vivisection firm. This special consideration was vital 
for HLS’s continued viability and should be considered as an important 
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and valued part of HLS’s capital. These interventions are evidence of 
SHAC’s determination, combativeness, and innovative tactics. 
SHAC has provided organizers with important lessons on how 
PEDCs provoke the anxieties of capital. Investors have a twofold fear: 
1) fear of being personally targeted; 2) fear that the fear of others will 
drive down the value of the stock. With their success in isolating HLS 
within the business “community,” SHAC demonstrated how activ-
ists can leverage the naked commitment of capital to accumulation. 
Although the banks’ managers who swore not to do business with 
HLS almost certainly personally despised being forced to capitulate, 
that was of no consequence; one segment of capital will not make a 
principled stance in defense of other segments. Short of a threat to 
capitalism itself, the accumulatory process means capitalists are more 
than willing to sacrifice their compatriots if doing otherwise risks their 
own accumulation.
Conclusions
Aside from damaging that which capitalists covet most—profits!—
PEDCs are also integral to movement building. Whether we succeed 
in closing sweatshops, put a stop to the manufacturing of weapons, 
or halt the destruction of nonhuman life, we are actively challenging 
those accumulating rewards at the expense of others’ suffering. While 
confronting our enemies, anarchist organizers must also consider the 
forms, structures, and practices that we undertake to prefigure a radi-
cally different society. Neither concrete PEDC goals nor prefigurative 
practices can take precedence, and fighting to win is about both.
Marxists and the traditional left have for too long fixated on sec-
tarian identities and dogmatic programs at the expense of challeng-
ing dominant forces that, especially for those of us from privileged 
backgrounds, live next door. We must acknowledge that resistance to 
corporate globalization takes infinite forms and struggles, and not all 
anti-corporate campaigns are anti-capitalist. One of the leading orga-
nizations in the movement against Nike, and sweatshops in general, 
was United Students Against Sweatshops (USAS). Not only were they 
not anti-capitalist—although active members certainly were—they 
intentionally mimicked the hierarchical structure of the corporations 
they targeted. This resulted in a leadership structure that privileged 
the type of male-dominated, competitive, and non-participatory 
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environments that anarchists are committed to eliminating. Similarly, 
animal rights activism, including SHAC, has been criticized for not 
making connections with other forms of violence and oppression. De-
spite such legitimate critiques, are committed anarchist organizers to 
forsake these (and similar) movements?
We think not. Capitalism has evidenced a remarkable resilience. 
The differential process results in plasticity that demands anti-capitalists 
work with (or at least support) allies who may not share our organizing 
principles or prefigurative ideals. This does not require compromising 
our principles. It is possible to balance vigilance towards centralizing 
tendencies that reproduce hierarchical and non-participatory power 
structures, avoid the exclusionary and reactionary divisiveness that 
limits movement building, and work short-term with allies who share 
the limited goals of a PEDC. Anarchists, not hampered by excessive 
theoretical prescription, can work toward short-term outcomes that 
will have real and desirable consequences, even if just to set capital 
back on its heels for a moment. Fighting to win is a twofold process of 
both damaging the existing power structure and prefiguring a humane 
post-capitalist society. 
Participants in PEDCs need to recognize the limitations of such 
endeavors in terms of challenging capitalism itself. Given the differen-
tial nature of accumulation, there will always be capitalist beneficiaries 
of PEDCs. Capital always flees to another, who welcomes its arrival. 
We believe Nitzan and Bichler’s theory of differential accumulation 
offers the best means of understanding precisely how anti-capitalists 
can effect change within capitalism through the confrontation of capi-
tal. The theory draws attention to the qualitatively complex structures 
and processes that constitute accumulation. It also makes us aware of 
how far our interjections into the accumulatory process can go. Any 
victory that fails to topple the ethical justification and juridical appa-
ratus of private property that make possible capital and accumulation 
will always be a partial victory. That means no particular campaign 
need be criticized as such, for we are always aware that it is. 
If we understand capital as the quantification of claims over quali-
tatively complex social processes, we cannot treat all corporations as 
the same. The high diversity of social assets that are drawn upon to 
make profits means each corporation will have different vulnerabilities. 
The same tactics cannot be reflexively used against different targets. 
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Diversity of tactics becomes not an ethical position, but a tactical ne-
cessity. While public awareness may be sufficient against some targets, 
others may require direct action.
Part of any transition will be a transformation of the political eco-
nomic hierarchy. The vested interests will not simply disappear under 
the weight of their own contradictions. We can mess with them all we 
want, but if we cannot affect their ability to accumulate and augment 
control over social processes, then we have no hope of moving beyond 
the capitalist status quo.
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